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1 4 does do this), but because it functions through a war-like architecture. It deploys an "architecture of enmity", a drawing of the lines between self/other; us/them; safe/risky; inside/outside, that makes going to war possible (Shapiro 1997) . Though political geography has given critical attention to the performativity of the violent imagination of threat, this has most commonly focused on spaces where the presence of war is visceral and visible -where uniformed military personnel are present of the city streets (Katz 2007) ; when urban spaces are the targeted sites of war (Graham 2004) ; or in the tangible violences of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay (Minca 2005) . In this paper, I explore the less visible spaces where the architecture of enmity is present in the form of algorithmic war. In the first section, I trace an extended example of algorithmic calculations deployed to identify "hidden" associations between people, groups, behaviours and transactions.
Initially developed to allow commercial retail players to take strategic decisions in an uncertain future marketplace, algorithmic "rules of association" have become the basis for pre-emptive state security decisions. In the second section, I focus on the spatiality of algorithmic war, arguing that it has a geography of locatability. Discussing the homeland security applications of radio frequency identification (RFID) technologies, I suggest that the dispersed and diffuse locations of the supply chain (offshore, export processing, control from a distance) are incorporated into state border controls (RFID passports and visas, tracking technologies in public space). Algorithmic war appears to make it possible for the imagination of an open global economy of mobile people, objects and monies, to be reconciled with the post 9/11 rendering of a securitized nation-state.
Probability/Security: Algorithms at the Checkout and in the Subway
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the homeland face of the war on terror identified an enemy whose probable future actions were already visible in the traces of life left in existing data. Giving evidence at a US Congressional hearing only five months after 9/11, IBM"s federal business manager testified that "in this war, our enemies are hiding in open and available information across a spectrum of databases" (Intelligent Enterprise 2002: 8) . Technology consultants and IT providers such as IBM have made the generation of 5 probabilistic association rules the forefront of homeland security practices. The idea is that locating regularities in large and disparate patterns of data can enable associations to be established between apparently "suspicious" people, places, financial transactions, cargo shipments and so on (Amoore and de Goede 2005; Ericson 2007 ). Rules of association are produced by algorithms -models or "decision trees" for a calculation (Quinlan 1986 ). In effect, algorithms appear to make it possible to translate probable associations between people or objects into actionable security decisions. In 2003, for example, a US joint inquiry concluded that "on September 11, enough relevant data was resident in existing databases", so that "had the dots been connected", the events could have been "exposed and stopped " (2003: 14) . It is precisely this "connecting of dots" that is the work of the algorithm. By connecting the dots of probabilistic associations, the algorithm becomes a means of foreseeing or anticipating a course of events yet to take place:
If we learned anything from September 11 2001, it is that we need to be better at connecting the dots of terrorist-related information. After September 11, we used credit card and telephone records to identify those linked with the hijackers. But wouldn"t it be better to identify such connections before a hijacker boards a plane?
(US Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff 2006) . The algorithm appears to make possible the conversion of ex post facto evidence in the war on terror into a judgement made in advance of the event. The significant point here is that probabilistic knowledge, based on the databased residue of daily life, becomes a means of securitization. As the US Inspector General concluded in his survey of government applications of algorithmic techniques, "association does not imply a direct causal connection", but instead it "uncovers, interprets and displays relationships between persons, places and events" (Department of Homeland Security 2006: 10) . It is the specific visualization of threat, then, that marks out the algorithm as a distinctive mode of calculation -to be displayed on the screens of border guards, stored on subway travel cards, shared between multiple public and private agencies. In this sense, the algorithm 6 produces a screened geography of suspicion, on the basis of which "other" people are intercepted, detained, stopped and searched (Amoore 2007 ).
How has it become possible, then, for the algorithmic rules of association to become the basis for everyday securitization in the war on terror? In one sense the algorithmic mining of data on the population within the war on terror is but one specific turn in a long history of incorporating uncertainty into calculations via statistics, what Ian Hacking (1990) has called the "taming of chance". Yet, it is in the more prosaic recent histories of probabilistic knowledge in the commercial sphere that algorithmic logics have really begun to define the management of uncertain futures of many kinds -from flood risk in the insurance industry to catastrophe risk in the financial markets (Baker 2002) . One particular resonance between the mathematical sciences and commercial worlds is especially worthy of discussion for its subsequent role in processes of securitization. In the summer of 1992, IBM research fellow Rakesh Agrawal met for lunch with a senior executive of UK retailers Marks & Spencer (M&S). Working on mathematical models for locating associations between items in "accumulated data" at the IBM-Almaden research centre, Agrawal proposed that M&S"s vast data on daily transactions could be used to take strategic corporate decisions. The research paper that resulted from the IBM-M&S meeting, and from subsequent work with US retailer Wal-Mart, has become the world"s most cited work on commercial algorithmic techniques for data mining (Agrawal, Imielinski and Swami 1993) .
Let us pause here and briefly reflect on the logic of Agrawal"s algorithmic model. "Consider a supermarket with a large collection of items", he writes, "typical business decisions might include what to put on sale, how to design coupons, how to place merchandise on shelves in order to maximize profit" (Agrawal, Imielinski and Swami 1993: 207) . Progress in bar-code technology, the research finds, has made it possible to screen transactions "for association rules between sets of items" and "to present an efficient algorithm for that purpose" (1993: 207). Agrawal"s examples of commercial questions that the algorithm could model include such prosaic queries as: What pattern of purchases is associated with Diet Coke?; What pattern of items has to be sold with 7 sausages in order for it to be likely that mustard will also be sold? What proportion of transactions that include bread and butter also include milk? The deployment of algorithmic calculations in this context signals an important move -from the effort to predict future trends on the basis of fixed statistical data to a means of pre-empting the future, drawing probable futures into imminent and immediate commercial decision.
The IBM work on association rules in the mathematical and computer sciences, though it achieved ubiquity by "connecting the dots" in prosaic settings and everyday transactions, Of course, in one sense there is nothing at all novel in the co-authorization of security decisions by the mathematical and computing sciences, the military and the state (Edwards 1996; Light 2003; Martin 2003) . Indeed, a reading of Jenny Edkins" study of the physicists Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr suggests historical parallels between the "uncertainty principle in physics", the "cosmology that made the atomic bomb possible", and the "interpretation of human actions" (2003b: 363/369). Put simply, the rejection of causality by quantum physics (embodied also in Agrawal"s non-causal associations) resonates with the science that makes the absolute violence of the atomic bomb possible, as well as with the idea of uncertainty in the social world. Taking Edkins" argument to our concern here -the deployment of algorithms in everyday securitizationwe can point to a coalescence between indeterminacy in the physical sciences, the emergence of virtual and "network" warfare, and the rise of inference and suspicion in the security decision. What is novel in the contemporary moves to algorithmic war, then, is the specific form that the aligning of science, commerce, military and the state is taking.
In the emerging geography of algorithmic war, the relationships between science, expertise and decision are radically rearticulated so that distinctions between "science"
and "non-science", "expert" and "inexpert" knowledge become more malleable. It is not strictly the case, then, as Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle have it, that where "scientific data on risk is absent" there is a turn to "non-scientific forms of knowledge that are intuitive, emotional, aesthetic, moral, and speculative" (2004: 138) . Instead, on the one hand, scientific data begins to incorporate the emotional, affective and speculative domains while, on the other, knowledges considered to be "non-scientific" are authorized as science. Data-led algorithms that model and track the movement of bodies or objects 9 through space now coalesce with intuitive, speculative and inferential knowledges that imagine future scenarios.
Consider, by way of example, the multiple interacting forms of algorithmic knowledge that are emerging in the transitory spaces of the subway. Surveillance cameras, equipped with facial and gait recognition technologies, track "atypical" movements such as repeated traversals of a platform (Hale 2005) ; "smart" travel payment cards store journey data and identify anomalies; and poster displays urge the public "if you suspect it, report it". If algorithmic techniques are concerned with anticipating an uncertain future, then the logic of algorithmic war is one of identifying norm and multiple deviations from the norm. To be clear, this is not the norm that is familiar to studies of disciplinary society.
As Foucault explains, "disciplinary normalization posits a model and tries to get people, movements, and actions to conform to this model [the norm]" (2007: 57). In the security apparatus, by contrast, we find "exactly the opposite of the disciplines", where we have "a plotting of different curves of normality… the interplay of differential normalities"
(63). Understood in this way, the algorithm becomes a very specific modality of the "imaginative geography" of the war on terror. It plays it part in making possible the 10 interplay of differential normalities -not forever settling out normal and abnormal, permitted and prohibited, but allowing degrees of normality.
Citing international relations scholar Michael Shapiro, Derek Gregory argues that "geography is inextricably linked to the architecture of enmity", to the overlapping practices through which "collectivities locate themselves in the world and thus how they practice the meanings of Self and Other that provide the conditions of possibility for regarding others as threats or antagonists " (2004: 20) . Yet, Gregory"s "spiraling networks" do not fully push the limits of Shapiro"s architecture because they return the geopolitics of violence to the disciplinary norms of battlefield spaces, obscuring the subtle differential violences of the "surveillance network" of the "end-of-violence organization" that Shapiro later depicts (2004: 121) . In the name of homeland security (the end of violence), algorithmic war reinscribes the imaginative geography of the deviant, atypical, abnormal "other" inside the spaces of daily life. The figure of enmity to be feared and intercepted need not only dwell in a represented outside in the geographies of Iraq or Afghanistan, for the outside can be inside -in the body of the migrant worker (differentially normal in the space of the economy and abnormal in the spaces of immigration), the young Muslim student (permitted to study but observed in the college"s Islamic society), the refugee (afforded the hospitality of the state but biometrically identified and risk rated), the British Asian traveler (granted visa waiver but ascribed an automated risk score).
Thus, the emergent geography of a twisted and conjoined figure of inside and outside, where "one does not know on which face of the strip one is located" (Bigo 2001: 115) .
For Didier Bigo, this is a spatiality of the policing of multiple and variant lines between self and other, an "everyday securitization from the enemy within " (2001: 112) . Here the architecture of enmity becomes the means of securitization itself, such that the distinction between "real" war (with accompanying visceral violence and bloodshed) and the war by other means (legitimated by securing against future violence) becomes permeable. The network warfare depicted in accounts of a "military-industrial-media-entertainment (MIME) complex", where "information is no longer a subsidiary of war", extends the stealthy war-like practices "more widely and deeply into our everyday lives (Der Derian 2002; see also Dillon and Reid 2007) . Consider, for example, the Oracle Corporation"s software, already ubiquitous in our lives, providing IT platforms for payroll, pensions, health care, the bibliographic searches used in academic research, and so on. Their algorithmic security systems -Non-Obvious Relationship Awareness (NORA) softwaredeveloped for the entertainment industry and used in the Las Vegas casinos -are now deployed by the US Justice and federal intelligence agencies for counter-terror.
According to Oracle consultants, NORA enables clients to identify "obscure relationships between customers, employees, vendors, and other internal and external data sources".
NORA searches for behaviour patterns or personal associations that hint at terrorist activity, turning data into actionable intelligence" (IDC 2004: 11) .
The association rules of the algorithm claim precisely to identify associations, to connect state that is concerned to make visible the minutiae of daily life, to seek security in the transactions, journeys and movements that are the norm and those that are suspicious. Put simply, algorithmic war requires a target for its calculations, preferably a moving target.
The practice of tracking, then, seeks to "detect, process and strategically codify a moving phenomenon in a competitive theatre", whether this space is a "battlefield, the social arena, or the marketplace" (Crandall 2006: 4) . In this sense, tracking technologies enable the identification and location of moving targets. In the war on terror, the specific form has become what Samuel Weber calls a "target of opportunity", a competitive "seizing"
of "targets that were not foreseen or planned" (2005: 4). The targets of opportunity in the war on terror, then, involve the depiction of mobile enemies:
However different the war on terror was going to be from traditional wars, with their relatively well-defined enemies, it would still involve one of the basic mechanisms of traditional hunting and combat, in however modified and modernized a form: namely "targeting". The enemy would have to be identified and localized, named and depicted, in order to be made into an accessible target… None of this was, per se, entirely new. What was, however, was the mobility, indeterminate structure, and unpredictability of the spatio-temporal medium in which such targets had to be sited… In theatres of conflict that had become highly mobile and changeable, "targets" and "opportunity" were linked as never before. Kang and Dana Cuff call "computer addressability", the fixed location of the address is loosened via "unique identification codes " (2005: 94) . Because the codes dwell inside a body or object in the physical environment, they do, at least in theory, make it locatable in movement.
In this shift from addressability to locatability, the ability to track and trace mobility is achieved by animating the physical environment so that it is able to "respond directly to what it sees" (Kang and Cuff 2005: 94) . Thus, the "reader" of traces, markings or transactions, established via the early technologies of punch cards and barcodes, becomes ever more important to the system of location as "addresses move with human and nonhuman actants" (Thrift 2004: 183) . Rather as IBMs early computers inferred people"s life histories from the patterns punched into the cards, and from the intervals between them, contemporary readers of location, as a group of researchers at Intel have put it: "infer people"s actions from their effect on the environment, especially on the objects with which they interact" (Smith et al. 2005: 39) . The embedding of RFID tags into objects, as
Smith and his colleagues have shown at Intel, can be understood as one means to achieve a novel and mobile form of targeting.
The origins of contemporary RFID technology, perhaps unsurprisingly, also find some roots in military communications and logistics, with the earliest writings on the problem to be found in research by radio engineers seeking more efficient readability of signals (Stockman 1948) . It should be clear, then, that we cannot say that contemporary security applications of RFID are simply drawing on commercial knowledges of location. The 1940s research was, in many ways, the precedent for contemporary RFID technologies that deploy miniature tags, emitting a radio signal with a unique numeric identifier that can be received by a reader up to 25 feet away (Borriello 2005) . Composed of a silicon chip and coiled antenna, usually sandwiched inside a plastic tag, so called "passive"
RFIDs use the power supply from the reader to send their signal and are, therefore, smaller and require closer proximity to the reader than "active" tags that carry their own power supply. For example, a passive RFID application such as a supermarket loyalty card that is read at the till is, in effect, inert until it is in range of the reader that activates it. Once in range of the reader, the RFID"s numeric identifier allows the reader to locate the tag and to associate data on past readings of transactions. For a supermarket shopper"s "loyalty card" this might include patterns of past purchases, coupons or vouchers for savings and such like. For a US-Mexico border crossing card holder, the passive tag signals an identifier that can be mapped across past patterns of travel, criminal convictions or terrorist watch lists. In this way, the RFID identifies the target for algorithmic calculation, at the border, at the supermarket check-out, at the entrance to the sports stadium, in the subway ticket hall. "Through RFID tags", as Jerry Kang and Dana
Cuff have it, address is specified "to a fine level of granularity, much finer than a zip code", so that we "will likely authenticate our identity to multiple queries of "who are you" made by the enacted environment" (2005: 106).
What are the implications of mobile forms of locatability for algorithmic war and, in particular, for the exercise of sovereign power? As RFID stands on the brink of replacing bar code and paper-based markers of location (I 94 forms, passports, train tickets, paper money at toll booths, tickets for sports events), 6 how does the war on terror become enmeshed with the geographies of everyday life? To be clear here, the seizing of targets of opportunity by commercial players can in no sense be interpreted as transcending the nation-state or outsourcing state security decisions to the market. Rather, a logic of outsourcing and targeting that exceeds any specific public or private domain -that is, as Samuel Weber suggests, a "militarization of thinking" -works to sustain the "hyphen" in the imagination of nation-state differently (Sparke 2005: 48) . It does so, I will argue here, via a spatial and temporal deferral of security decision that follows the dispersed geography of the commercial supply chain.
The state"s ability to track and trace people or objects in movement, across or beyond its borders, is increasingly bound up with commercial techniques for tracking and tracing objects through the supply chain. The paradox of security and mobility -the problematic of the moving target -is given the appearance of being fixed by technologies of locatability. As David Campbell writes, "were it possible to bring about the absence of movement", that would represent "pure security", yet it would be at that moment that "the state would wither away" (1992: 12). The question is not one of how to arrest mobility, then, but how to govern mobility in such a way as to allow circulation and to sustain the impression of securability. Put simply, to secure the sovereign power of the Gillette has allowed these commercial players to seek efficient locations in distant places, and yet to sustain the ability to control with precision (Eckfeldt 2005) . The very idea of an animated supply chain, making its own algorithmic calculations and judgementsfrom "smart refrigerators" to smart supermarket shelving and tracked shipments (Günther and Spiekerman 2005) -incorporates the bodies and objects of production and consumption, from the growers, pickers and producers of raw materials, through manufacturing, supply and retail workers.
In the most vulnerable offshore spaces of the global economy, where commercial firms seek only the most fleeting of finger holds in a specific territorial space, we begin to see how the commercial targeting of things and objects plays into and through the targeting of people. Thailand"s export processing zones -or "free zones" -for example, have
become "e-free-zones", using RFID to track the movement of imported materials, deliveries, exported goods, and, significantly, the bodies of workers, as they traverse the boundaries of the zone. The fortified security fences associated with export processing zones, then, are augmented by equally carceral, but less obviously visible, lines that track and trace the movements of workers via "contactless" smart cards, and the mobility of 19 objects via RF enabled smart labels. Similarly, the extension of RFID into border crossing cards and immigration documents allows the feigned impression of an open world, while it institutes new lines and boundaries. There is a growing resonance, then, between apparently geo-economic systems of locatability (of course always also political)
that target the bodies of workers and the movement of the objects with which they interact, and the algorithmic security practices of the state:
It plays out in new systems of production that aim to narrow the intervals between conception, manufacturing, distribution and consumption -shrinking the delays between detecting an audience pattern and formatting a new enticement that can address it. It plays out in pre-emptive policing and warfare systems that aim to close the gap between sensing and shooting. (Crandall 2006: 13) .
As Jordan Crandall depicts the geographies of tracking and targeting, they play in and out of the plural spaces of our world. As the commercial tracking technologies enter the sphere of security -RFID passports, "smart" national ID cards, RF-enabled immigration and visa documents, the tagging of detained asylum seekers, employee "contactless"
buildings access cards -they defer security decisions into algorithmic calculation. The participation of RFID in violent geographies is thus often obscured. When global consultants Accenture made their successful bid for the USVISIT "Smart Borders"
contract, for example, they simulated the ability of RFID to target from a distance:
Using a nearby facility belonging to Raytheon, a subcontractor on its team, the It is important to recognise at this point that we can only gain a limited understanding of the technologies of algorithmic war by seeing them as explainable by the post 9/11 deepening of political economies of surveillance (Lyon 2003) . The capacity of RFID to make us locatable is actually acutely ambivalent: we feel its potential to watch and to incarcerate just as we simultaneously feel it fulfil some of our desires and pleasures. As Matt Sparke has illustrated in his study of the biometric proximity cards used in the USCanadian border NEXUS programme, the appeal is made to "the fast lane, where you want to be " (2006: 167) . Similarly, RFID is offered as a means of expediting mobility in the UK"s Heathrow airport "MiSense" programme, promising to "simplify your journey through the airport while maintaining security". 7 The MiSense programme, by incorporating smart sensors into the possession of the subject -"my sense" -invites an almost playful encounter with RFID sensors. This stitching together of playful leisurely RFID encounters with security practice asks the subject to voluntarily offer themselves up to tracking technologies in return for expedited movement. In some of the most playful forms of RFID use in the leisure industry -subcutaneous chips inserted into the arms of customers at a Glasgow nightclub so that they may pay for their drinks without 21 the hindrance of cash or cards; RFID golf balls that communicate their location to a remote reader -we can see security dreams fulfilled. Night club patrons secure their precleared identity and financial details beneath their skin, and golfers seek out a means of securely locating distant objects. Where RFID "pleasures and anxieties cohabit", the targeted line of sight sorts and segregates finite degrees of visibility so that, for some, "the edges are smoothed" as they "blend seamlessly into the crowd" (Crandall 2006: 12) .
For others, of course, the line of sight targets for heightened exposure to visibility -to stop and search, to continually verify identity, to have movement in public space checked and intercepted.
Conclusions: Securability and Algorithmic War
You won"t get by the booth… You look too young to be driving out of state"… But there is nobody in the booth built to hold a toll-taker. Nobody. A green light flashes E-Z PASS PAID and Ahmad and the white truck are admitted to the tunnel.
(Updike 2006: 298).
In a final scene of John Updike"s novel Terrorist, the protagonist Ahmad drives his truck bomb to the entrance of the Manhattan-bound Lincoln tunnel. His passenger and reluctant mentor, Jack Levy, urges him that the security guard will detain him on the grounds that he looks too young to have a state license permitting him to drive out of state. At the boundary line of the city, Levy feels sure, their fatal journey will be halted, their movement intercepted. What Levy does not anticipate is the RFID transponder on the windshield of the truck, sending a signal to the barrier reader, algorithmically calculating -is the truck licensed?; is the toll pre-paid?; has the vehicle been reported stolen? The calculation is made, a green light flashes and the truck enters the tunnel.
In Updike"s novel, the practices of homeland securitization are revealed in all their contingency and unpredictability (asked by his wife what the Homeland Security 22 department"s elevation of threat from yellow to orange means, Levy replies "It means they want us to feel they have a handle on this thing, but they don"t"). The algorithmic technologies, so readily established at the forefront of the securitization of borders and boundaries of many kinds, are revealed in Updike"s novel to be intrinsic to the feigning of securability. The point here is that we know not, in any meaningful sense, what algorithmic war will do beyond giving the impression that things/people/commodities can be secured against an imagined enemy. It could have been the case -had the association rules shown the white truck to be on a watch list database, or the E-Z Pass to be expired, or had a previous transaction flagged a risk -that the algorithm signalled a red light and the movement of the truck would have been intercepted. Yet, these are the contingencies of the relationship of the algorithmic calculation to the actual everyday geographies they seek to model and simulate. These are the unknowns, the indeterminacies of algorithmic war.
The question, then, is how to open up these contingencies and ambiguities in order to
politicize what would otherwise be a highly technologized set of moves. "Uncertainty and unpredictability can be unsettling", writes Jenny Edkins, "in the rational west, we tend to seek certainty and security above all. We don"t like not knowing. So we pretend that we do" (2003a: 12). The algorithmic war I have described here -with its dividing geographies of us/them, safe/risky -is precisely one means by which we "pretend that we do". Algorithmic logics appear to make it possible to translate probable associations between people and objects into actionable security decisions, or to incorporate the uncertain future into the present. The practices of this war by other means, then, are themselves productive of quite specific pre-emptive forms of war and violence. Though the everyday geographies of this "other" war on terror are partially militarizing, in the sense of drawing military practice more closely into proximity with everyday life, they are more meaningfully drawing on a militarization of thinking that is co-present in corporate calls for risk targets and the riding out of uncertainty, in state drives to target, track and trace people and objects, and in the suspicions and prejudices of an enlisted vigilant public.
